Pier 1 Imports

One claims it's the company's only chance for survival. Atari has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 3-1-0-0-0. EWA presents the difference between Kodak is filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. What's up, guys? My name is Jake and welcome to the 9th episode of Bankrupt. If you've ever sought out to decorate your own living space, you'll know it's a crowded market full of many options. Just a few years and decades ago, however, there was one brand which was Even further back, it was one of the only quality and interesting options to buy from. But over a rather short amount of time, they lost their way and eventually collapsed entirely in 2020. So let's take a deeper look into what happened to this classic, well-known brick-and-mortar chain and how pure one imports, ultimately, went bankrupt. This episode is sponsored by CuriosityStream. Get it as well as the creator Runnebula by using the link in the description below. San Mateo, California was the location of their first store. It was created by Luther Henderson and later invested in by Charles Tandy. Tandy might sound familiar for some of you, mainly because he was the business mind behind Radio Shack. They opened in 1962 under the name Cost Plus Imports, and the premise was to import cheap, ratten furniture and sell it at a markup within a liquidation store format. It was already very popular, and by 1966, they had started importing even more exotic goods from Asia and changed their name to Pure One Imports. By the next year, sales had grown to over $4. 5 million annually, and steadily increasing as sales grew. By now, they had multiple locations across the country, and with ambition to grow even more, they filed for an initial public offering on the American Stock Exchange. It was now 1970, and this effort proved to be very effective, now giving the Fort Worth-based company lots of capital to expand. Just within a few years, the brand grew to over 120 stores with enormous sales growth. By the early 1980s, they continued that moment Things were changing for the company as they began to shift their entire product strategy away from exotic overseas goods to more traditional and contemporary items. A healthy mix between the two. They were now targeting the ever-lucrative first time and sophisticated homeowners in America. This mon Luckily for them, in a survey they conducted in the mid-1980s, 86% of people claimed they decorated their own home. When the media reported on the survey, Pure One was front and center, essentially being advertised alongside their findings. The brand was quickly becoming the most popular place for amateur interior designers to shop, and that with their new preferred cardholder membership, customers were not only returning to Pure One, but they were also spending much more. By 1989, there were over 550 stores producing over $517 million in sales. The brand expanded internationally now too, opening stores in new countries. However, it was the early 1990s which now saw a slowing economy and more competition, two potentially deadly combinations if not handled right. So Pure One imports applied the brakes a bit. During this time, the corporation had done some restructuring, ultimately stabilizing losses, yet taking on some long-term debt. However, at least for now, Pure One imports was on top of their markets. Still, the go-to place for home accessories. In 1994, they posted $685 million in sales and grew their stores to over $600 million. The chain also expanded their product availability, still offering unique goods from overseas, while also fleshing out other categories Allowed the company to grow year after year, but still, their CEO, Clark Johnson, had even bigger aspirations. As more stores continued to open across the world, Pure One imports had reached their long-term goal when they surpassed $1 billion in sales by the end of 1998. However, as the millenni 2000, while earning lots in sales, the year-over-year growth had slowed rather dramatically. This was also another time when similar furniture and home accessory stores started to gain some steam, which ultimately started to bite away at Pure One's market share. Brands But that didn't stop them from expanding, which once again was back in full force. By around 2003, the company had opened their 1,000th store and posted $1. 7 billion in sales, with $129 million of that being profit, which is pretty good and by far the highest ever achieved for the brand. The products in the stores were priced much lower than the rivals, which caused a huge influx of customers. They were absolutely killing it in sales during this time, as Pure One had now become a household name across North America. Their stock price too was drifting into insane waters, as they crossed $500 a share. Back in their stores, Pure One had been making it clear that while importing foreign treasures was still a big part of their product line, they were also expanding categories in furniture, kitchen accessories, and pillows. However, in reality, their place in the market was becoming the go-to brand for people who wanted something at Pottery Barn, yet couldn't afford it. Pure One was becoming a discount Pottery Barn. 2006 is when the company had peaked with the n Across the world, there were over 1,300 Pure One import locations, all of them very much not ready for the next few years. By 2009, the recession had hit, and their stock took a nosedive all the way down to $2 by March. The company was forced to close stores and lost almost $130 million that year. The recession had crippled the brand, which just a few years prior was posting their highest sales figures ever. The company's CEO position was switched out, and Alex Smith took the helm, guiding the brand out of this precarious spot. By 2010, they regained profitability, and did so for the next eight years. Their stock price too rebounded quite significantly, shooting back up to over $470, a 20,000% increase, which I'm sure made many investors a lot of money. However, with sales approaching the $2 billion mark, the company had looming issues that weren't entirely apparent at first glance. Mr. Smith had turned the company around, however when he left in 2016, things began to fall apart. In 2017, sales were already on a downward trend, as was profits. By the following year, it was even worse, and by 2019, the company had lost almost $200 million by the end of that year. Pure One was now capturing just a little over 2% of the entire market. Things were getting bad, and the brand bled money every quarter. The coming pandemic of 2020 was going to be the final blow. With a final push to market to young buyers, the long downfall had finally come to its end. The brand had almost $250 million in long-term debt. In order to pay that off and recover from their dire financial situation, 2020 would have needed to be a great year for the company. Of course, however, that's not how things turned out. After announcing they would close over 400 stores, by the next month, Pure One imports had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. In this filing, they also announced they would be shutting down the entirety of their Canadian operations. By May, with the United States imposing closure restrictions for retail, Pure One had decided to liquefy its remaining assets after no buyers were found to bail the company out. This was the end of Pure One'stores. To put this in perspective, their stock went from $503 a share in May of 2013, down to just 24 cents today. I don'think I've ever seen that sharp of a drop for a stock price ever in that span of time for a retail brand. It is a staggering fall from the top. However, while locations began to close all across America and the world, their intellectual property and online e-commerce operations were purchased by Rev, or Retail Ecommerce Ventures, which is strangely co-owned by Tai Lopez. Okay, but how did this happen? Because while the unprecedented events of 2020 surely did accelerate their demise, it certainly isn'the only or even the primary reason. It really all began with their first attempt on creating a website in June 2000. It was rudimentary with a little online inventory which eliminated the main draw of searching for hidden treasures in the store. It was a costly endeavor by the company and ultimately it was shut down in 2007. This allowed the competition to take its place in the online e-commerce, as Pure One stuck to just brick and mortar. Eventually in 2012, they relaunched the website, however the damage was done. But it's not just online sales that they handled poorly. It was in their stores and even where those stores were placed, Pure One began adding locations and cheaper clauses, often next to discount stores or unrelated market retail. This started a perception issue with the brand and inside the stores, things weren't much better. The chain struggled to move inventory, which meant their stores would constantly have clearance shelves with tons of stock in them. This caused their stores to appear clutter and not well organized, just further hindering the brand reputation and cons The products that were on the shelves were generic and undistinguished from other cheap home stores. Remember, Pure One had started out as a treasure hunt for people to come into their stores and find unique items and contemporary home products. The makeup of their inventory did as well. In a February 2020 New York Times article,